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反垄断法中宽恕制度之消极适用主体研究——以卡特尔主要作用者的认定标准为中心 被引量:8

On Subject of the Negative Application of Leniency Program in Antitrust Law——Defining Standards of Role-in-the Cartel as the Core
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摘要 由于卡特尔行为具有严重的危害性和秘密性,许多国家采用宽恕制度来打击和威慑此类反竞争行为。出于公平考虑和防止宽恕制度被不当利用,各国反垄断法执行机构往往规定卡特尔主要作用者不能适用宽恕待遇。目前大体存在两种类型的卡特尔主要作用者认定标准即领导者适用标准和胁迫者适用标准。由于卡特尔领导者适用标准中领导者、发起者等在实践中很难界定以及该标准受到理论上的责难,一些原先采用该标准的国家后来采用了胁迫者适用标准,而另外一些采用卡特尔领导者适用标准的国家则对该标准进行修正。从最新的修正情况来看两标准存在趋同迹象。 Because of serious harm and secrecy of cartel,many countries fight and deter this anti-competitive conduct by leniency program.To ensure fair treatment and to prevent improper use of leniency program,every antitrust authority excludes a person who play an important role in cartel from leniency programs.There are two standards about defining a person who play an important role in cartel,which are leader-standard and coercer-standard.Because leader and originator of cartel are difficult to be defined in practice and leader-standard is criticized in theory,Some countries which had adopted the leader-standard later adopted coercer-standard,and others countries amend the leader-standard.Judging from the latest amendments,there are signs of convergence of two standards.
作者 毕金平
机构地区 安徽大学法学院
出处 《华东经济管理》 CSSCI 2010年第7期138-141,共4页 East China Economic Management
基金 2008年度司法部国家法治与法学理论研究重点课题"反垄断法实施问题研究"(08SFB1007) 安徽大学青年科学研究基金项目
关键词 反垄断法 宽恕制度 消极适用主体 卡特尔领导者 卡特尔胁迫者 antitrust law leniency program subject of the negative application leader of cartel coercer of cartel
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参考文献11

  • 1European Union.Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel eases[EB/OL].[2009 -09-18] http://eur-lex.europa,eu.
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