基层政府运行中的“过度关系化现象”——一个政府行为的组织制度与关系网络的竞争逻辑

"Over-guan-xi Phenomenon" in the Operations of Local Governments——The Competitive Logic between Organization System and Relational Network of Governmental Behavior

在中国基层政府的运行中,一个普遍存在的现象是,无论是正式权力的获取与行使,还是各类资源的竞争与分配,都存在着一种非正式的关系网络途径,这在一定程度上导致了基层政府的合法性危机。文章在综合人际关系学派、社会文化学派和关系网络学派的基础上,用"过度关系化"这一概念对这类现象进行了概括,并从政府制度的合法性机制与关系网络的效率机制之间的内在竞争逻辑出发,提出了三个解释性的命题:(1)竞争目标差异命题;(2)制度约束效力递减命题;(3)竞争成本比较命题。研究表明,过度关系化现象是组织制度的合法性机制与关系网络的效率机制之间不对称竞争的结果。而要对这一现象进行治理,就必须从稳定的组织制度体系与结构的改革入手,寻求组织制度与关系行为之间的平衡。

＂over-guan-xi＂ is a common phenomenon in the operations of local governments. This paper gives a paradox explanation from three propositions for the phenomenon： the difference of competitive goal, the diminishing of system stringent effectiveness and the comparative competitive cost. The results of this paper show that ＂over-guan-xi＂ phenomenon is the asymmetric competition between legitimaey mechanism of government system and the efficiency mechanism of guan-xi network, we must reform the stable organization system and structure and seek the balance between＂ guan-xi＂ behavior and organiza, tional system.