中国上市公司收购兼并的市场预期绩效实现了吗？

On the Market Expectation of Performance of M&A of Listed Companies in China

本文以发生在2002年至2006年期间相对交易规模最大的191起中国上市公司(即收购公司)收购兼并事件为样本,不仅采用事件研究法对收购兼并的市场反应绩效进行了分析,同时还从难以操纵的现金收益(即股权自由现金流量/资产总市值)角度,采用财务指标法分析了收购兼并的财务绩效,重要的是本文将收购兼并的市场反应绩效与财务绩效联系起来,来研究收购兼并行为引发的对收购公司未来预期现金收益变化是否会在收购兼并完成后的经营年度逐步得到实现。研究结果表明:收购兼并不仅给收购公司股东带来显著财富增加,而且其中蕴含的未来预期现金收益增加也得到一定程度实现,表现为收购兼并的市场反应绩效具有较强的正向趋同性,且与实际财务绩效具有一致性;进一步分析发现:对于投资者产权保护机制不好的公司,市场反应绩效与实际财务绩效间的一致性会减弱;另外,虽然收购兼并财务绩效总体上升,但对于不能绝对控股的非关联收购兼并事件,其财务绩效显著下降,而对绝对控股的关联收购兼并事件其财务绩效显著上升:该结果预示着在具有绝对"话语权"和信息占优、利益相关者对抗程度较低的情况下,更有利于收购兼并后的资源整合并能为上市公司带来好处。

Using event study methodology and accounting ratio analysis respectively, the paper examines the performance implications for the largest 191 M＆As of listed Chinese companies between 2002 and 2006. The authors also analyze whether market expectation of performance improvement from M＆A can be realized in postacquisition years. The results indicate that M＆A increases the value of shareholders of the acquiring firms, the underlying expectations of improved performance are also realized in the future. In other words, the marketbased performance of M＆A is synchronized with the accounting-based performance. Further analysis shows that poor shareholder property rights protection weakens the consistency between market-based performance and ac- counting-based performance of M＆A. It is found that accounting-based performance of M＆A depend on whether the acquiring firm has controlling power and whether the M＆A is a related transaction. Specifically, M＆A has a negative effect on the performance when the acquirer has no controlling power and the transaction is not a related party transaction. In contrast, M＆A has a positive effect on performance when the acquiror has controlling power and the transaction is a related party transaction. These findings suggest that when the acquirer is the dominant player in M＆A transaction and encounters little resistance from relevant constituencies, greater benefits from M＆A transaction can be realized.