企业创新技术转让价格的信号博弈分析

An Analysis on Signaling Game of Enterprise Innovative Technology Transferred Price

在创新技术转让中存在着转让企业和受让企业双方信息不对称现象,建立信号博弈模型,对其可能出现的混同均衡、分离均衡和准分离均衡状态分析,得出只有分离均衡状态才是最理想最有效率的均衡。为确保创新技术转让交易成功,受让企业应加强调查研究,提高判别能力;技术转让企业应加强品牌建设,提供优质的产品;健全和完善技术交易市场的信息披露制度;政府部门应加强对交易市场的监督,杜绝欺诈行为。

Asymmetric information exists in both enterprise and the transferee when transferring innovative teehnology. This paper establishes Signaling Game Model to analyze potential pooling equilibrium, separate equilibrium and quasi separate equilibrium, and finds that only separate equilibrium state is the most ideal and efficient equilibrium. To ensure successful innova- tive technology transfer, the transferee enterprises should strengthen investigation and research, and improve diserimination eapability; technology transfer enterprises should enhance brand building, provide high-quality products, and improve and perfect the disclosure system of technology market; and government departments should strengthen trade market supervision to prevent fraud.