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药品安全监管的动态博弈分析 被引量:5

Dynamic Game Analysis on the Drug Safety Supervision
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摘要 目的:研究药品安全监管中监管主体与监管对象的动态博弈关系。方法:采用博弈论模型进行分析。结果与结论:药品安全投入不足会对药品安全产生负面影响。对于监管者,需完善药品安全监管法律法规,总体应加大监管力度,且应对各种被监管者进行分类监管;对于被监管者,其在逐利过程中应严格遵守法律法规,更应注重长期利益。 OBJECTIVE:To conduct the dynamic game analysis on the relationship of monitoring subject and monitoring object in drug safety supervision.METHODS:Game theory model was used for dynamic game analysis.RESULTS CONCLUSIONS:For monitoring subject,the defect of drug safety supervision had negative impact on drug safety.Laws and regulations for drug supervision should be improved to enforce drug safety supervision.Monitoring subject should be supervised based on their category.Monitoring object should abide by laws and regulations and focus more on the long-term interest in the process of pursuing interests.
出处 《中国药房》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2010年第25期2324-2325,共2页 China Pharmacy
关键词 药品安全 监管 博弈论 Drug safety Supervision Game theory
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