委托—代理理论中最优合约的制定

The Design of the Optimal Contract——Agency Theory vs. Managerial Power Theory

以信息经济学的基本原理——委托—代理理论和现在流行的管理权力理论为基础,研究在管理合约中包含激励薪酬和固定薪酬的情况下,最优合约的制定问题。利用Holmstrom-Milgrom模型的基本框架和确定性等值的概念,在激励相容约束(IC)、个人理性约束(IR)和有限责任(LL)的条件下,分别分析在委托—代理理论和管理权力理论中最优合约的制定。

This paper is based on principal -agency theory which is the basic principles of informa - tion economics and managerial power theory, the popular theory of the firm now. We study how to design the optimal contract when the manager＇ s contract comprises a stock -based pay and a fixed salary. This paper uses the basic framework of Holmstrom - Milgrom model and the concept of certainty equivalent. When the managerial contract satisfies the manager＇s incentive compatibility （IC）, individual rationality （IR）, and limited liability （LL） constraints, we design the optimal contract in the principal - agent theory and managerial power theory.