非对称信息下企业的物流外包服务商数量选择模型

Quantity Determination Model of Logistics Outsourcing Service Providers under Information Asymmetry

探讨了外包过程中服务商数量变化与合同价格制定、服务质量以及对双方价值剩余的关系影响。模型在以往非对称信息下委托代理模型的研究基础上,加入了物流代理商个数参数作为激励约束条件,提出了代理商预期努力水平和实际服务质量两个行为指标。结果显示,给定环境系数,物流外包企业的价值总收入关于服务商数量的函数存在极大值,具有较优的服务代理商数量。同时服务努力水平及质量会随提供商数量的变化产生相应影响,在一定条件下随提供商数量的减少而提高。

The paper explores the relationship between the quantity of outsourcing service providers,contract pricing and service quality as well as the influence of the quantity upon the surplus value of both sides of the contract.On the foundation of previous researches,the paper extends the principal-agent model under information asymmetry by incorporating the quantity of logistics service providers as an incentive and a constraint condition and by proposing the two behavioral indices of the expected diligent level and actual service quality of the providers.An empirical study with the extended model shows that,with given environmental coefficients,the function of the total revenue of the logistics outsourcing enterprises about the quantity of service providers has a maximum value,that is,there existing an optimal quantity of service providers.It is also found that the diligent and quality level of the providers would change accordingly with their quantity and would,under certain circumstances,increase when the quantity decreases.