从产权视角看我国上市公司现金股利分配

The Profit Dividend of Chinese Listed Companies in Perspective of Property Rights

文章从产权理论中的监督成本角度分析我国上市公司中高层管理者(很多情况下,高层管理者直接来自控股股东)与中小股东在现金股利分配上存在的分歧。由于目前我国保护中小股东权益方面的法律不健全以及中小股东对公司决策上自我权利保护的缺失,导致了中小股东对高层管理者(尤其是具有控股权和公司管理权的股东)在股利分配政策决策方面的监督成本十分高昂。要解决这个问题,不仅需要国家制定相应的法律法规保护,而且中小股东自己也要提高在公司中参与决策和积极性和管理意识。

This paper will, from the perspective of the supervisory cost in the theory of property right, analyze the differences on cash dividend distribution between the middle and senior level administrator （in many cases, senior managers directly come from the controlling shareholders） and minority stock holders in Chinese Listed Companies. Due to the infirmity of current law in protection of minority shareholders＇rights and the lack of protection of the minority shareholders rights in decision - making, the cost of supervision of senior managers （especially those with controlling rights and corporate management rights） on the dividend distribution policy decision is high. To solve this problem, not only should the government to formulate relevant laws and regulations, but also the minority shareholders should improve consciousness in the decision - making and management in the corporation.