摘要
中小企业信用担保体系的出现,一定程度上减轻了中小企业面临的信贷配给,并缓解了众多中小企业的融资压力。然而,信用担保机构与企业之间仍然存在信息不对称性,这又导致了中小企业信用担保市场的逆向选择和信用担保配给现象。理论上,阿克洛夫首先用二手车模型证明了信息不对称导致的逆向选择以及相应的效率问题。从理论上可以证明:担保机构因信息不对称将面临着逆向选择和道德风险,而逆向选择则降低了担保市场的效率。通过信用担保市场逆向选择和信用担保配给机制分析,可以为有效地控制逆向选择以及完善我国中小企业信用担保市场功能发挥积极的作用。
Credit guarantee is an effective way to solve financing bottleneck for SME,but information asymmetry between SMEs and credit guarantee institutions results in the phenomena of adverse selection and credit rationing in credit guarantee market.Akerlof proved that Pareto-Improvement cannot be achieved because of adverse selection in his ＂second-hand car market model＂,while this paper proves adverse selection that was caused by information asymmetry will reduce the efficiency of credit guarantee market.Consequently,it is very important to give theoretical analysis on adverse selection mechanism of credit guarantee,and then to offer policy proposal on how to control adverse selection of credit guarantee.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期67-70,共4页
On Economic Problems
关键词
信息不对称
中小企业
信用担保
逆向选择
information asymmetry
SMEs
credit guarantee
adverse selection
