摘要
就公司僵局而言,美国司法曾避免介入公司内部矛盾。之后,以公司在经济上是否有存续意义为判断标准,后发展为以期待利益落空为理论基础、以法院介入为手段的多种解决方式。大陆法系国家由拒绝司法介入发展到有限介入。我国1993年《公司法》,无公司解散之司法救济通道。新公司法借鉴国外立法例,首次确认司法介入公司僵局之法律途径;《关于适用公司法若干问题的规定(二)》,细化了股东请求人民法院解散公司之诉的裁判规则,为尊重公司之生命,严格限定了解散公司之法律构成要件。现行公司法对公司僵局的司法介入仅规定解散之诉的单一救济方式,无公司管理领域司法权介入、无外部救济措施及清算和清算程序的明确规定,其相关规则过分谨慎而僵化,应予补充和完善。
In terms of company deadlock, the U. S. justice has once avoided interfering in companies’ internal conflicts, taken the significance of the company’s existence as judgment criteria, looked forward to the fall of interests as their basis, and then had the court to intervene as a means of solution. Civil law countries had an evolution from the denial of justice involvement to the limited involvement. The Company Law 1993 of China had no judicial remedies for company dissolution. But the new one, taking the enactment of legislation of other countries for reference, identifies the legal solutions for the first time by judicial intervention to company deadlock. Some Provisions about How to Apply Company LawⅡ has added some detailed rules of adjudication about the dissolution of the company shareholders and the people’s court proceedings in order to respect the life of companies, which strictly limited the constituted legal conditions of company dissolution. The company law in use needs to be improved and completed due to its over-cautious and rigid rules. It only requires dissolution of single proceeding remedies for judicial intervention to company deadlock. Besides, there is no judicial power to intervene the field of corporate governance, no external relief measures and no clear definition for liquidation and liquidation procedures.
