非对称信息、企业安全投入与政府规制效果——兼析强制保险的安全影响

Asymmetric Information,Enterprises' Safety Investment and Effect of Government Regulation——With the Discussion of Security Implications of Compulsory Insurance

煤矿安全已经成为中国经济社会发展进程中不可忽视的重要问题。本文以完全信息下的企业与工人安全投入决策模型及其均衡结果为分析的标尺,通过比较不完全信息与完全信息下工人与企业预防投入,分析揭示煤矿安全规制中的道德风险问题。最后,结合中国实践进行煤矿安全规制效果研究。分析结果表明,在社会强制保险的前提下,政府规制行为并不必然是帕累托改进,也并不必然提高社会福利水平。本文分析结论支持适中的规制强度,并强调规制机构应对工人的安全预防行为给予更多的关注,并建议规制机构改革以"标准"为核心的安全规制方式。

This paper logically explores the problem of moral hazard in workplace safety regulation,based on which,impacts analysis of safety investments of companies workers and government regulation on safety is given.In this paper,a decision-making model of companies’ and workers’ safety investments under the complete information is established,which is the benchmark of the analysis.By comparing companies’ and workers’ safety investments between complete and incomplete information,the nature of moral hazard in workplace safety regulation is revealed.The results show that government regulation is not necessarily Pareto-Improving and does not necessarily improve social welfare on the condition of compulsory insurance.Finally,moderate regulation is strongly recommended and regulatory agencies should play more stress on safety precautions investments of workers.