摘要
在1962年台海危机中,中美通过华沙大使级谈判渠道沟通各自意图和政策底线,避免了形势的误判和冲突升级。危机也引起了肯尼迪政府内部对于美国对台政策的辩论,其结果是美国仍然维持"战略模糊",但是同时也出现了"双重威慑"的雏形。
During the 1962 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China and the United States tried to find out each other's intentions and policy red-lines and made effective communications through the channel of Warsaw Ambassadorial Talks, thus avoiding misjudgment of the situation and the escalation of crisis. The crisis also gave rise to a debate within the Kennedy administration regarding U. S. policy toward Taiwan. The end result of the debate was that the United States would maintain a "strategic ambiguity" ; meanwhile an embryonic form of '" dual deterrence" also emerged and became an integral component of U. S. policy toward Taiwan.
出处
《中共党史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期60-69,共10页
CPC History Studies
基金
北京大学人文社会科学青年教师科研启动基金资助