基于产业集群的税收竞争模型

The tax competition mode based on industrial clusters

引入产业集群租金变量并藉此建立了税收竞争模型,分别讨论了集权与分权下政府税率的选择及影响因素.结果显示:在存在集群租金影响情况下,政府可以通过设定税率和选择地区基础设施类型来影响受到资金不可分割制约的企业投资地的选择.在满足中央和地方政府效用函数及设定的约束条件下,求解了中央和地方政府之间税收竞争的最优均衡解,并讨论了最优解成立的条件.

The paper tried to build a tax competition model by the reference of industrial clusters rents variable, and discussed the government＇s choices of tax rates and its effective factors under the circumstance of centralizations and decentralizations. The results show that, under the impact of clustered rents, the government is capable to fix tax rate and choose regional infrastructure patterns to influence the choice of enterprises＇ investment location, whose capital is undivided. This paper, by forming the central and local governments＇ effective functions and correlated restricted terms, elicits the optimal equilibrium solution for tax competition between the central and local governments, besides, the paper discusses factors for the establishment of this solution.