惩防体系的软肋:国企腐败的制度依赖性透视

The Weakness of Anti-corruption System:On the System Dependence of Corruption in State-owned Enterprises

国企腐败是中国最大的腐败。政治与经济双重体制的逆向挤压是国企腐败高发的动因。一方面,国家对国有企业的监管依旧是以行政化手段为主,自上而下的公权力对国有企业起到决定性作用,而国企正是依赖这种公权力,获得民营企业无法企及的超额垄断利益。另一方面,国有企业具有市场经济主体的属性,在国家监管、社会责任与公益目的极度弱化的情况下,多元化的经济行为和经营方式又成为其谋取私利的重要途径。瓦解国企强势既得利益集团谋利行为在于分类监管。公益性类企业的监管模式应当摒弃市场化监管手段,实行以政府监管为主、社会民主监督为辅助的监督模式;对竞争性国企应确立"非禁即准入"原则,建立国有资产退出机制。从根本上说,国企腐败治理关键在于瓦解国企腐败所依赖的制度环境,以全面改革代替局部改革,以制度创新代替制度修补。

Corruption in state-owned enterprises is the most serious corruption in China. As the consequence of the double political and economic impact, the corruption there appears at a high rate. On one hand, administrative means being applied as the main methods in supervision, the top-down government authority plays a decisive role in state-owned enterprises. Depending on this power, they possess the excess oligopoly profits which can＇t be obtained by civilian-run enterprises. On the other hand, as a main part of the market economy, state-owned enterprises have more means to gain profits with the diversified economic activities and management models under the severe weakening of national supervision, social responsibility and public service. Disintegration of the powerful profit group in state-owned enterprises lies in the categorized supervision. The supervision model aiming at the public-service enterprises should abandon the means of market supervision; apply the model with the government supervision as the primary methods and social democratic supervision as the supplementary ones. The policy that it will be permitted if not prohibited should be applied into the competitive state-owned enterprises. The institution that the state-owned assets can be taken back should also be established. Fundamentally speaking, the anti-corruption in state-owned enterprises lies in disintegrating the system dependence atmosphere, reforming comprehensively rather than partly, and creating new policies instead of correcting old ones.