摘要
本研究目的在于调查2002年至2004年间,中国上市公司之高管人员薪酬与自由现金流量,对于公司风险承担的影响,同时剖析两者之交互效果。此外,在进行公司规模分组后,进一步观测大小公司是否存在显著差异。实证结果显示提高高管人员薪酬确能有效降低公司风险的承担,且过多的自由现金流量及营运状况不佳的公司,会具有较高的违约风险,但藉由高管人员薪酬的增加,方可降低自由现金流量所产生的负面效果。在公司规模分组方面,上述效果仅发现存在于小规模的公司,大公司均无统计上的显著关联。对此结果,本研究亦推论此差异可归因于大规模公司具有较高的政治成本和高经济景气联动两个原因所引致。
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of manager＇ s compensation and free cash flow to risk - taking in China public offering companies over 2002 to 2004, and to analyze the interactive effects. In addition, we further examine whether the size effect has a significantly difference after separating firm size into large and small sub - sample. The empirical results present that the increasing the manager＇ s compensation can effectively reduce the risk - taking for firm, and the firm of higher free cash flow as well as bad performance will hold the highly default risk. However, the negative influence from free cash flow can be offset by increasing manager＇ s compensation. In the sub - samples, these outcomes are only found in the group of small size but not in the group of large size. Regarding the results this paper infer that the reason may contribute to the effects of both higher political cost or higher economic environment in large firms.
出处
《科学决策》
2010年第7期10-17,73,共9页
Scientific Decision Making
