摘要
在决定池田勇人大藏大臣于1950年访美的问题上,作为日本首相的吉田茂,起了主导作用,但是不能将池田勇人一行的访美说成是吉田绕过麦克阿瑟的盟军最高统帅部又撇开日本外务省而直接与美国政府接触的首次尝试,从某种意义上来讲,应是吉田在征得麦克阿瑟的同意、采纳外务省意见基础上与美国政府进行直接接触的首次尝试。《吉田口信》是吉田与麦克阿瑟合演的双簧戏,白洲次郎向美方所传递的与《吉田口信》相互矛盾的信息减弱了后者在促进早日媾和中的作用。池田勇人的访美无论从出发点还是从实际效果而言只起了试探性的作用。
In determining the NPC Finance Minister of Japan Hayato Ikeda's visit to U.S. in 1950, the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had played a predominant role, but it couldn' t be said that Hayato Ikeda's visit was a first try of Shigeru Yoshida to contact with U. S. government directly by passing MacArthur's Supreme Allied Command and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a sense it could be considered as the first try with U.S. government directly of Yoshida with approval of MacArthur and the adoption of the views of the Foreign Ministry. "Yoshida message" should be considered as the Yoshida and MacArthur co - operation show; In fact, the conflict between the information conveyed by Jiro Shirasu to the U.S. side and the "Yoshida message" reduced the latter's effect on promoting the San Francisco pacification. Hayato Ikeda's visit to the U.S. in terms of starting point or from the actual effect is concerned only as a tentative role.
出处
《烟台大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期93-100,共8页
Journal of Yantai University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)
关键词
日美关系
美军基地
和约
Japan - America relationship
U.S. Army Base
Pacification