上市公司非公开发行资产注入行为的股东利益研究

Shareholders’Interests in Non-public Offerings of Asset Injection

本文首先对上市公司非公开发行资产注入行为的股东利益均衡问题进行了数理分析,数学推导得出,上市公司股东利益均衡的条件是非公开发行的增发价等于上市公司每股内在价值。本文继而选取中国股市49家通过非公开发行完成资产注入的上市公司作为样本进行实证考察。实证检验发现,中国上市公司通过非公开发行进行资产注入的新股定价普遍偏低,显著低于股票内在价值;同时,注入的资产大多为非优质资产。进一步研究发现,新股定价和注入资产的质量均与上市公司资产规模有一定联系:定价偏高的公司普遍资产规模较小,定价偏低的公司则资产规模较大;注入优质资产的公司规模一般较大,注入劣质资产的公司规模明显较小;而成本较高的资产注入行为,都是资产规模比较小的公司在该轮牛市中指数上涨最快的时期实施的,投机动机很强。实证结果表明,非公开发行资产注入中上市公司股东利益并不均衡,存在着众多大股东侵占小股东利益的现象。

This paper constructs a mathematical model to analyze the equilibrium of shareholder’s interests in the non-public offerings of asset injection, and demonstrates that the equality of non-public offering price and intrinsic value per share is the critical condition to realize the equilibrium. The empirical tests show that non-public offering prices are significantly lower than intrinsic value per share on average, and most of the assets injected are not high-quality assets. Further research finds there is some relationship between issue prices and sizes, and between asset quality and sizes. Companies whose issue prices are relatively high have smaller sizes and those whose prices are low have bigger sizes. At the same time, companies that receive good-asset injection are bigger and those that receive bad-asset injection are obviously smaller. Moreover, the fact that high cost injections are incurred by small companies in a bull market indicates a strong speculative motivation. The results of our study indicate that there is an interest inequality among shareholders in the non-public offerings of asset injection.