所有权性质、公司治理与控制权私人收益

The Nature of ownership, Corporate Governance and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from China’s listed Companies

大股东对中小股东的侵害问题是公司治理领域的一个重要问题,通过测算控制权私人收益可以间接了解大股东对中小股东利益的侵害程度。本文将控股股东的类型分为国家股、国有法人股、法人股和个人持股,分别测算了我国上市公司控股股东的私人收益。研究发现:(1)国有法人的控制权私人收益最高,私人控股的控制权私人收益次之。(2)在国有股中,股权集中度、股权制衡度、国有股比例对控制权私有收益有一定的抑制作用,国家控股公司更倾向于采取在职消费等隐蔽方式攫取控制权私人收益。(3)在私有股份中,股权集中度和制衡度与控制权私人收益成反比但作用有限,这种现象在个人控股公司中更为普遍。董事长与总经理两职合一与控制权私有收益正相关。独立董事比例可能并不是影响控制权私人收益的主要因素。研究结果对我国正在进行的国有民营化改革具有一定的政策启示。

The expropriation of small shareholders by large shareholders is one of the most important issues in the field of corporate governance, while measuring the private benefits of control（PBC）could bring indirect understanding of embezzlement level. The paper measures the value of PBC by dividing the controlling shareholders into such types as state-owned shares, legal person of state-owned shares, legal person shares and personal shares. The result of empirical study shows that ：（1） the legal person of state-owned shares’ PBC is the highest and the personal shares’PBC is less important;（2） for the state-owned shares, the decentralization of share, bal-ances power of shareholder, and the proportion of state-owned shares have restrained effects on PBC, companies controlled by state are more likely to gain PBC by overhead cost;（3） in the personal shares, the decentralization of share and balances power of shareholder are negatively related with PBC, while their effects are limited. And CEO/ chairman duality is positively related with PBC. No evidence shows that the proportion of independent directors can influence the PBC. The results could provide some suggestions to China’s share-holder structure reform.