中国土地利用规划制度创新机制分析

Institutional Innovation Mechanism of Land Use Planning in China

我国土地利用规划制度的发展,实质上是中央政府和地方政府为追求自身利益的最大化而进行的反复博弈,是规划制度从平衡,到不平衡,再到平衡的过程,体现了土地利用规划制度的创新机制。土地利用规划制度建立的初衷是保护耕地和限制建设用地,确保土地的可持续利用,但从短期看不可避免地导致了经济增长速度的降低;本文通过建立中央政府和地方政府的博弈模型,结果证明中央政府和地方政府的行为在理论上可以达到平衡,但实际情况是中央政府对违反规划的惩罚措施并不具有实质的危险,造成中央政府强化监督的力度和地方政府违法规划的力度都将大大超过理论值。解决这一问题的途径是通过土地利用规划制度的创新,纠正土地用途管制与经济发展之间的矛盾,为此中央政府必须积极营造鼓励地方政府创新的环境,调整两者在创新收益上的分成比例,降低地方政府制度创新的成本,达到地方政府积极创新、中央政府支持创新的双赢局面。

The development of land use planning system is the iterated game between the central government and local governments that pursues maximum interest in China,which is the process of planning system from balance to imbalance,then to balance,and reflects institutional innovation mechanism of land use planning system.Land use planning system was originally conceived to protect arable land and limited construction land,and to ensure sustainable land use,but it inevitably leads to reducing the economic growth rate in the short term.Through establishing game model between the central and local governments,this article proves that the behavior of the central and local governments could reach equilibrium in theory,but actually the penalties of the central government couldn＇t threaten interests of local government,and the probability of the central government strengthening supervision and local government violating planning will greatly exceed the theoretical value.This article indicates to adjust the contradiction of land use regulation and economic development through the mechanism innovation of land use planning.The central government must actively create innovation environment,adjust the innovation gains share,reduce the innovation cost of local government,finally achieve a win-win situation that local governments actively innovate and the central government supports innovation.