摘要
委托代理理论对信托关系中代理人信任机制的研究有限,制约了养老金制度的发展。本研究通过对养老金信托的定性和政策环境分析,以及管理过程中成本、收益和利润的定量分析,指出在信任和长期合作的条件下,管理费制可抑制风险,同时养老金规模将像雪球一样在预期中超常发展,并实现受益人利益最大化,即养老金信托雪球效应。以往研究主要在信息不对称假设下利用参与约束条件寻找最优解,本研究表明在引入信任契约和管理费制后,可实现各方主体共赢的目标,由此证明了信任在养老金委托代理关系中的可能性和促进养老金安全运营的必要性。这一问题的解决,对于帮助受托人拟定管理费率、明确受托人在管理过程中的阶段性定位并据此做出战略决策、推进养老金信托文化、构建人口老龄化背景下的养老金市场安全运营机制、打造可持续发展的养老金制度,具有重要意义。
A lack of research of agent trust mechanism in principal-agent theory has hindered the development of pension system.This article presents that,based on trust and long-term collaboration,management fee proposal can resist risk and the pension scale will develop rapidly,leading to utilization maximization of beneficiaries,a.k.a.the snow-ball effect of pension trust.In previous literature,it concentrates more on searching for a constrained optimal solution with assumption of information asymmetry,while this article presents that,a multi-party win-win game is accessible when a trust contract and a specified management fee proposal is introduced and therefore demonstrates the importance of trust in pension principal-agent theory and the necessity of a secured pension operation.This is instrumentally significant to negotiate the management fee rate,specify the strategic role in a phase sense,promote the culture of trust pension,construct and maintain a secured pension marketing infrastructure with ageing of population and ultimately render a sustainably developing pension system.
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期166-173,共8页
China Population,Resources and Environment
关键词
养老金信托
管理费制
雪球效应
pension trust
management fee proposal
snow-ball effect