评估委员会制度中权力分配的一个方法

A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System

在一个委员会的决策制度中,某个个体成员的权力可定义为:个体决策者成为获胜联盟获得成功时的关键投票者的机会,或者定义为成功阻止本来要获胜的联盟的机会。通过随机安排投票顺序,每个投票者处于关键位置的次数被计算出来,由此而确定的便是投票者的权力指数。在给定模型下所得到的指数是委员会体制中各成员权力分布的先验评估。一个更强的论断是:计算委员会制度中成员之间的权力分布的任一模型,若不满足该权力指数定义,就会导致逻辑上的不一致。该方法能够用来计算联合国安理会、美国国会等决策机构的权力分布。该方法可以说明:通常只需要一小部分的股票就能够控制一个公司,掌权的集团通常能够召集足够的代理人去维持它的地位,因为股东的权力也不与他们所持的股票成正比,而是偏向大股东。权力指数反映了委员会制度本身的一个基本要素,权力指数的出现能够为立法机构和政策制定部门的基本设计提供有效信息。

The power of an individual member in a committee system is defined as the chance he has of being critical to the success of a winning coalition,or as chance of the ＇blocker＇who turns a possible success into a defeat.By arranging randomly the order of voting,the number of times that each member to be the critical can be computed.Thus,we obtain a power index of each voter which is a priori.A stronger assertion is that any scheme for imputing power among the members of a committee system either yields the power index defined above or leads to a logical inconsistency.This method can be employed to calculate power division in organizations such as the United Nations Security Council and American Congress.And it can explain that usually only a small fraction of the stock is required to keep control of a corporation,and the group in power is usually able to muster enough proxies to maintain its position because the power of stockholders is not directly proportional to their holding,but is usually biased in favor of a large interest.The indices represent a basic element of the committee system itself,and they offer useful information concerning the basic design of legislative assemblies and policy-making boards.