协作型双方道德风险组织激励配置效率分析

Allocation Efficiency of Incentive Problem in Collaborative Organization with Double-sided Moral Hazard

本文给出了双方道德风险组织激励问题的基本分析框架,建立了完全信息、单方信息不对称和双方信息不对称等不同信息结构下双方道德风险组织激励问题的规划模型,通过引入Cobb-Douglas生产函数,全面对比分析了不同信息结构下协作型双方道德风险组织激励的均衡努力、最优契约和效用水平,揭示了协作型双方道德风险组织激励效率配置的特点与规律。

A basic analytic framework for incentive problem with double-sided moral hazard is proposed,and the programming models for incentive problem with double-sided moral hazard under different information structures are constructed.Through introducing Cobb-Douglas production function into the programming models,equilibrium effort,optimal contract and utility level in incentive problems in collaborative organization with double-sided moral hazard are comparatively analyzed all side.This paper opens out the character and law of allocation efficiency in incentive problems in collaborative organization with double-sided moral hazard.