摘要
医生不仅是医疗服务的提供者,也是医疗服务需求水平的决定者,极易发生诱导行为。由于医疗服务具有无形性、不可分离性、不一致性以及医患之间信息的不对称性,决定了医生的诱导行为对医疗费用攀升起着决定性作用。防范该行为的有效主体是医保机构,而二者之间的主要博弈渠道则是医疗保费的支付方式。因此,应该根据不同的支付方式对诱导需求的作用机制,确定医疗保费支付方式的选择原则以及通过多元办医、建立医生个人信息库、对消费者进行告知选择等改善医患之间的信息不对称性。
Doctors are medical service providers as well as the deciders about demand level of medical service.They often generate induced behavior easily.Medical service has invisible,inseparable,inconsistent attributes and asymmetric information between doctors and patients,which makes the induced behavior from doctors play a decisive role in the rising of medical cost.Medical insurance institutions are the efficacious principal to keep away the induced behavior,while the payment method of medical insurance is the main game channel.Therefore,depending on the function mechanism about payment method impacting induced demand,constituting principle to choose medical insurance payment method,mending asymmetric information between doctors and patients via multiple medical office,establishing personal information database of doctors,and informing consumers about choices,etc.
出处
《南昌大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期86-90,共5页
Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)
关键词
医疗服务
提供者诱导需求
医疗保费支付方式
medical service
induced demand from providers
medical insurance payment method