公共部门定点扶贫的利益冲突与平衡

Game Relationship in Fixed-point Poverty Alleviation by Public Sectors

公共部门定点扶贫,是指由党政机关等公共部门有计划地筹集资金以及派遣专职人员进驻重点贫困村,并通过各种渠道促使该村脱贫致富的一种扶贫模式。目前,在公共部门定点扶贫实践过程中,存在着公共部门、贫困农户和地方组织三个利益方之间的利益冲突,这些冲突极大地影响到定点扶贫的绩效。应通过建立博弈主体之间的有效沟通机制、建立有效约束博弈主体的制度规范和构建博弈主体持续合作的信任关系等方式来平衡各利益主体之间的冲突,以提升公共部门定点扶贫的绩效。

The fixed-point poverty alleviation by public sectors is the poverty alleviation mode that the public sectors of the Party organs and Governmental departments are planned to raise money and to dispatch specific persons to live in poor villages and to use all kinds of methods to make the villages become rich. Currently, in the processes of public sector＇ s poverty alleviation, there are interest conflicts between three parties such as public sector, rural poor households and local organization, and the conflicts seriously affect the performance of fixed-point poverty alleviation. The conflicts between each subject of interests can be mitigated by establishing effective communication mechanism between game subjects and by setting up institutions and regulations to restrict game subjects and by constructing sustainable cooperation trust relationship between game subjects and so on in order to raise the performance of fixed-point poverty alleviation of public sectors.