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交易成本、行为选择与治理经济学——2009年诺贝尔经济学奖得主奥斯特罗姆和威廉姆森学术贡献述评 被引量:1

Transaction Cost,Behavioral Choices and the Economics of Governance——A Brief Survey for the Academic Achievements of 2009 Nobel Prize Laureates in Economics
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摘要 新制度经济学学者近些年屡屡获得诺贝尔经济学奖。本文阐述了2009年诺贝尔经济学奖得主奥斯特罗姆和威廉姆森的主要理论贡献和社会影响,从经济学思想史的角度述评了这一学术流派的主要研究议题和已取得的突出成果,并展望了治理经济学的未来研究方向。奥斯特罗姆和威廉姆森分别以公共池塘资源的自组织和企业边界与经济组织的逻辑为核心,通过拓展经济学关于非正式制度和正式制度的成本和绩效研究,深化了人们对如何设计有效治理机制来解决交易、合作和冲突等人类基本行为的理解和洞察。 Why the NIE is granted for the Nobel Prize so many times and why it gets so extraordinary honor? To answer this question, this paper attempts to combine the theoretical contributions and social inferences of this year' s Laureates Ostrom and Williamson, to take a brief survey for the main research issues and achieved fruits of the NIE from the aspect of economics thoughts and to predict future direction of governance economics. We conclude that on the basis of CPRs' self-governance and the firm' s boundary and the logic of economy organizations, Ostrom and Williamson have deepened our knowledge and foresights on how to design efficient govern mechanisms to resole the basic human behavior such as transactions, cooperation and conflicts by broadening economic study for costs and performances of informal and formal institutions. Besides, we also summarize the future research directions for the NIE.
出处 《西部论坛》 2010年第4期29-36,共8页 West Forum
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70902072) 教育部人文社科应急课题(2009JYJR020) 浙江工商大学青年人才基金(Q09-9) 浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心招标课题(09JDSM09YB)
关键词 经济治理 池塘资源 自组织 企业边界 交易成本 新制度经济学 正式制度 非正式制度 economic governance common pool resources free organization enterprise boundary transaction cost neo-institutional economics formal institution informal institution
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参考文献10

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