负债的代理成本与管理层薪酬研究——基于中国制造业上市公司的实证分析

The Agency Cost of Debt and the Salary of Managerial Staff——An Empirical Study Based on Listed Companies of Manufacturing Industry in China

论文以2006年在上海证券交易所上市的制造业公司为样本,实证检验了负债的代理成本对我国制造业上市公司管理层薪酬契约的影响,证明我国制造业上市公司管理层薪酬与公司业绩之间的敏感度随着负债比率的提高而下降,这有助于上市公司管理层薪酬契约的制定。

Based on the examples of the listed companies of manufacture industry in Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006,this paper analyzes the impact of contract for the salary of managerial staff that arises from the agency cost of debt for listed companies of manufacture industry in China.It also testifies that the sensitivity of salary of managerial staff and the performance of the companies have negative relationship with the debt ratio,which helps us to make the mechanism of the salary of managerial staff for the listed companies in China.