反垄断领域中的宽大政策：实践、理论及中国的对策思考

Leniency Policy in Antitrust:Practice,Theory and Thoughts on China

宽大政策通过给予向反垄断执法机构自首的合谋参与者宽大待遇,阻止和瓦解合谋,该政策被证明是一个非常有效的工具。宽大政策在实践中的成功归因于其建立在坚实的经济学基础之上,它所依据的经济学理论是产业组织理论中的合谋理论和博弈论。在《中华人民共和国反垄断法》出台后,我国查处合谋行为的形势变得更加严峻,而就现实背景和法律背景而言,我国出台宽大政策具备了良好的基础,应当尽快研究和出台单独且完整的宽大政策,加强对合谋行为的查处。

Leniency policy can detect and deter collusion by reducing sanctions for colluding firms that self-report,which is proved to be a very effective tool.Success of leniency policy is due to the solid foundation of economics,and the policy is based on the collusion theory in the theory of industrial organization and game theory.After the introduction of Anti-monopoly Law,the regulation situation of China＇s collusion becomes even more severe.As for the realistic and legal background,we have a good foundation for introducing leniency policy.Anti-monopoly authority should research and introduce separate and complete leniency policy as soon as possible,in order to strengthen collusion prosecution in China.