业务流程外包的动态道德风险防范机制及其仿真分析

Dynamic Moral Hazard Prevention Mechanism in BPO Contract and Its Simulation Analysis

在长期业务流程外包(BPO)的合作关系中,发包方面临如何对承包方动态道德风险进行有效防范的问题。系统分析了BPO道德风险问题,在无道德风险和静态道德风险基准情形基础上,重点研究了动态道德风险及其防范机制,发现在综合承包方个人理性约束与激励相容约束的防范机制中,贴现因子是影响防范机制执行效率的关键因素。最后,通过数值仿真,对防范机制的基本逻辑进行直观解释。

In the process of long term Business Process Outsourcing（BPO） cooperation,outsourcing demander has to take measures to prevent outsourcing supplier from committing moral hazard.Through systematic analysis of repeated game model,it turns out that the efficient mechanism to prevent moral hazard is a mechanism that satisfies both individual rationality constraint and incentive compatibility constraint,what is more,discounting factor plays a vital role in effecting the degree of efficiency of the prevent mechanism.By numerical simulation,the basic logic of the mechanism is explained.