摘要
道德风险和逆选择并不是医疗保险中特有的现象,它们在任何商业保险和社会保险中都存在,但在医疗保险中更为严重。在新农合中,由于农民有自愿投保的选择权而保险机构却没有拒保权,面对的又是处于艰难生存环境的农村卫生机构,其道德风险和逆选择现象要严重得多,如果不能处理好新农合中道德风险和逆选择问题,将可能导致新农合的市场萎缩与效率的下降。本文就是在研究新农合中逆选择与道德风险生成机理的基础上,提出一些规避措施,为新农合的长期可持续发展奠定微观制度基础。
Moral hazard and adverse selection in heal th insurance are not peculiar,they exist in many commercial insurance and social insurance,but in the medical insurance even more serious.In the new rural cooperative,since the farmers have the option of voluntary insurance and insurance institutions were not refused insurance coverage rights,is also facing a difficult living conditions in rural health institutions,their moral hazard and adverse selection phenomenon is more severe,if can not handle the new rural cooperative medical in the moral hazard and adverse selection problems may lead to a new market for agricultural cocontraction and efficiency decline.This article is study of new rural cooperative medical adverse selection and moral hazard in the formation mechanism,based on the circumvention of measures put forward for the new long-term sustainable development of agricultural co-lay the micro-institutional basis.
出处
《特区经济》
北大核心
2010年第7期183-185,共3页
Special Zone Economy
关键词
道德风险
逆选择
生成机理
规避
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Formation mechanism
Avoid