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救市政策与道德风险的实证研究 被引量:1

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摘要 2008年美国金融危机波及全球,为防止金融系统的崩溃,美国政府采取了救市政策。然而实证表明,救市会引发道德风险,使得银行风险和规模之间存在明显的正相关关系,让大银行倾向于增加其风险。政府应当减小救助实施的概率,向市场发出信号以降低银行对政府救助的预期,从而缓解救市引起的道德风险。
作者 陈明
出处 《天津经济》 2010年第7期34-36,共3页 Tianjin Economy
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参考文献4

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二级参考文献7

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