摘要
运用福利函数分析方法,从PE微观分配视角,探析LP干预GP运作是否必要,对赌协议是否会影响被投资企业的经营运作行为,并由此分析PE分配机制中最常见的风险控制技术:GP承担无限责任、GP小比例出资以及超额收益分配的效力。研究认为,对赌协议和超额收益分配机制会导致企业和GP高风险运作,LP在运作的初期阶段并不需要过度干预GP运作,而GP承担无限责任并不能降低风险,需要适当转移风险给其他债权人,且GP小比例出资虽然可以降低风险,但过高比例出资反而降低LP福利。
From the view point of micro distribution of PE(Private Equity)and invested corporation,we discussed the necessary of intervene to GP(General Partner)by LP(Limited Partner),the high risk influence of VAM(Value Adjust Mechanism)technology to the invested corporation and GP,and the effect of infinite duty of GP,small scale invest of GP and the excess earning distribution mechanism,by building welfare function of GP and LP.We find that the VAM and excess earning distribution mechanism will lead the high risk operation of GP and invested corporation,intervene of LP to GP is no necessary,infinite duty of GP is not benefit to decline risk,risk has to be transfer to other creditor,but the small scale investment of GP will reduce the operating risk of PE,but high scale will reduce the welfare of LP.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第8期98-101,共4页
On Economic Problems
关键词
私募股权基金
微观分配机制
福利函数
超额收益分配机制
对赌协议
private equity(PE)fund micro distribution mechanism welfare function excess earning distribution mechanism value adjust mechanism