摘要
作者以西非国家经济共同体(西共体)为例,对戴维.贝尔斯等提出的"特惠贸易安排的和平效应源于制度层面而非经济一体化"的观点进行了修正,并提出了特惠贸易安排产生和平效应的限制条件。从西共体的历史过程来看,在同一制度框架内既有加纳与多哥之间冲突缓和的案例,也有马里与布基纳法索、塞内加尔与毛里塔尼亚这两组冲突升级的案例,这充分说明贸易制度安排的和平效应产生于制度框架之外。通过求同和求异法对上述三组冲突案例的比较分析发现:当冲突涉及两国的核心利益和强大的国内政治压力时,冲突就会升级,特惠贸易安排的和平效应不发挥作用;反之,只有当冲突不涉及两国的核心利益并且冲突国之间存在经济相互依存时,特惠贸易安排的和平效应才能够显现。
The commercial institutional peace research has provided much empirical evidence that regional trade institutions help reduce the escalation of interstate conflicts, and David H. Bearce and Sawa Omori argued in 2005 that the commercial institutional peace appeared more related to the institutional structures that often accompany the regional integration process. By making an historical observation of ECOWAS, one of the best examples of commercial institutional peace, the author finds out that under the same institutional structure some conflicts did escalate during the same period of time. Based on the comparison of the three conflicts (Senegal vs. Mauritania, Mali vs. Burkina Faso, and Ghana vs. Togo), the author concludes that only when conflicting issues are no vital interests of the countries involved and there’s strong economic interdependence between them can commercial institutions promote peace.
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第8期139-155,共17页
World Economics and Politics