排污权有偿使用政策的寻租博弈分析

Game-analysis of Rent-seeking in Environmental Regulation:A Case Study of Compensated Use of Emission Permits Policy

现行的环境规制为政府部门和企业提供了过多的寻租空间,可能使得环境管理效果和政策公信度下降,导致社会总福利受损,公众的利益被牺牲,因此应当对寻租行为采取积极有效的防范措施。本文系统分析了排污权有偿使用政策制定、实施和延续全过程中可能存在的寻租途径,包括游说政府,逃离管制范围,占有配额,拖延缴费,降低核定量和再分配收益。针对三种造成环境质量下降的逃避付费类寻租行为构建了政府、排污企业和公众的三方博弈模型,论证了寻租行为必然带来社会总福利的下降,并用逆推归纳法得到公众参与下环保局和企业的寻租期望值,筛选出了公众举报率,举报成本,企业违法成本,寻租成本等对企业寻租决策影响较大的因素。从完善法规制度和鼓励公众参与两个方面,对减少排污权有偿使用政策中企业的寻租动力,从根本上消除寻租行为提出了相应的政策建议。

Excessive rent-seeking space is considered to be a major factor which declines the public trustworthiness and efficiency of current environmental policies in China,resulting in social welfare loss and public interest sacrifices.Thus preventive measures should be taken actively against rent-seeking behaviors.A systematic analysis is conducted to conclude all possible enterpirses＇ rent-seeking approaches in Compensated Use of Emission Permits Program like lobbying,escaping the regulative scope,applying for additional approval quotas,payment delays,tampering the monitor data,and benifiting more from redistribution,ranging from policy-making and implemening redistribution.Focusing on three fee-avoidance rent-seeking behaviors that lead to deterioration of the environmental quality,a rent-seeking game model among pollutant enterprises,government and the public is esteblished,and expected values are calculated.It is proved that rent-seeking behaviors result in welfare loss.Based on backwards-induction method,determinative factors of enterprises＇ rent-seeking decisign are figured out like report rate,report cost,violation cost and rent-seeking cost.Policy recommendation is proposed from two aspects,improving regulation and encouraging public participation in order to weaken enterprises＇ rent-seeking drive in Compensated Use of Emission Permits Program virtually.