金融危机中我国国有商业银行贷款行为研究——一个多任务委托代理模型

The Research of State-Owned Bank Loan in the Financial Crisis——a Multi-task Principal-agent Model

国有商业银行信贷支持是金融危机中政府宏观调控政策发挥效力的重要渠道之一,在政府施加的政策性目标和自身利润最大化的双重任务约束下,国有商业银行道德风险增加,信贷行为产生"异化",导致资金投放偏离政府最初意图。本文在一个多任务委托代理模型框架下分析了金融危机中国有商业银行贷款激励行为和由此产生的信贷风险,并根据多任务之间的相关性对代理人的激励影响做出了拓展性解释。

The support of State-owned banks credit has played an important role in the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy of government in financial crisis. Under the dual task of financial supporting and profit-maximizing,the state-owned commercial banks increase the financial risk, cause the credit to depart from the government original intention.In this paper,we apply to the multi-task principal-agent model, analyses the incentive and restrictive mechanism and the credit risk of state-owned commercial banks in the financial crisis. Furthermore, according to the correlation of dual task, we explain the correlation effects on the agent＇s incentive.