摘要
在理论与经验证据的关系问题上,当代科学哲学涉及的核心问题是经验对理论的"不充分决定命题"。典型的"不充分决定命题"以"经验等值命题"为基础,强调经验对理论的非对称性和非决定性。但劳丹和利普林对"经验等值命题"的可靠性提出了质疑,认为这一命题只是一个猜测性的假设,它没有普遍性的理论根据;进而他们把"不充分决定命题"的理论基础归结为"后承主义",依据于经验对理论的直接确证。然后,劳丹等人利用"间接确证"模式,试图通过截断经验等值命题与不充分决定命题的逻辑联系来反驳不充分决定命题。
One of the important problem in modern scientific philophy is the relationship between theory and Observation,On the traditional view,theory choice is radically underdetermined by all possible evidence but Laudan and Leplin argued against the thesis of empirical equivalence and against the inference from it to the thesis of underdetermination.They maintain that there is no reason to suppose theory possess genuine empirical equivalent rivals,and even if two theories are empirically equivalent,it does not follow that they are equally well confirmed.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第8期19-24,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金资助(项目批准号:09YJC720026)
国家社科基金项目资助(批准号10CZX013)