摘要
本文研究了分权背景下的财政体制和政府治理对非经济性公共物品供给的影响。实证研究发现,财政分权显著且可观地降低了基础教育的质量,也减少了城市公用设施的供给。本文还发现,分权下的地方政府未能发挥规模灵活调整的优势;反腐败力度的增强,改善了基础教育的质量,却减少了城市公用设施的供给,显示出公共部门存在明显的寻租空间。此外,中央政府的向下转移支付促进了非经济性公共物品的供给,并且基础教育存在明显的规模经济效应,这支持了中央财政在公共部门具有发挥更大作用的必要性的结论。
This paper studies how the fiscal system and governance under fiscal decentralization with Chinese style affect Public Goods Provision. We find that fiscal decentralization reduces the quality of primary education significantly and remarkably, and the provision of municipal facilities as well. We also find that local governments haven't the freedom under standard federalism; and that anti-corruption activities improve the quality of primary education, while cut down the provision of municipal facilities, which implies that there are some rent-seeking opportunities. Moreover, central government's transfers to locals increase public goods provision, meanwhile primary education enjoys explicit sc',de economy, which gives the central finance the priority to play a bigger role in some public fields.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第8期4-15,65,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
"复旦大学985中国经济国际竞争力创新基地"
国家社会科学基金"我国的财政分权
地方政府行为与经济增长研究"(批准号:10CJY068)
上海市社会科学规划青年课题(KBH3246523)
复旦大学研究生创新基金优秀论文(EYH3246037)的资助
关键词
财政分权
政府治理
基础教育
公用设施
Fiscal Decentralization
Governance
Primary Education
Municipal Facilities