终极控股股东控制权与自由现金流过度投资

The Control Right of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder and Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow

本文从投资行为视角,研究控股股东侵占与公司治理问题。理论上首次通过动态模型方法,研究发现股权集中、控股股东的存在会导致公司过度投资,控股股东控制权与现金流权分离进一步加剧了这一行为,同时自由现金流水平也对过度投资有正向影响;现金流权水平的提高、公司治理机制的改善,则可以有效抑制过度投资。实证上基于Richardson(2006)预期投资模型,采用面板数据方法,研究表明控制权与现金流权分离度对过度投资有显著为正的影响,相对于私人控股,政府控股公司过度投资更严重,而外部治理环境的改善一定程度上抑制了过度投资。这一研究为中国改革开放以来大规模低效率投资现象提供了一定的解释,同时也为控股股东侵占提供了新的证据。

This paper studies controlling shareholder＇s expropriation and corporate governance through the perspective of investment. Theoretically this paper builds up two-period dynamic model to study overinvestment and expropriation, and finds out that the existence of controlling shareholder results to overinvestment, separation of control right and cash flow right further strenthens this action, and free cash flow also has positve effect to overinvestment. The improvement of cash flow right and corporate governance could constrain overinvestment. Empirically based on Richardson （2006）, this paper uses the panel data of 2004--2007 to verify the theoretical predictions, and finds out that separation of control right and cash flow right has significant positive impact to overinvestment, and when the company is controlled by government, overinvestment is more serious. This paper explains the phenomena of high-level but low-efficiency investment since China economic reform, and also privides evidences for controlling shareholder＇s expropriation from the perspective of investment.