区域矿产资源开采博弈的约束机制研究

A study on restrictive mechanism for games in regional exploitation of exhaustible resources

区域矿产资源开采行为的不可完全监督性和矿业政策执行力度的局限性通常约束政策的执行效率时,助推了中小矿山企业与政府的博弈。文章基于由此导致的开采外部性,尝试在明确矿业权人与政府博弈上限的基础上,提出"水准面"上限标准。进而利用"前景理论"和贝叶斯理论建模,通过分析依主观概率实现风险成本的心理预期感受,得出在贝叶斯风险成本诱导机制约束下,政府获得博弈主导优势和矿业监管倾向于帕累托有效。文章最后结合研究结论给出政策建议,为制定我国的矿业政策提供了重要的理论参考。

In regional exploitation industry of exhaustible resources,that,the incomplete implementation of Mining supervision and the limited extent of mining policy enforcement,often promoted games between small or medium-sized mining enterprises and Government.Based on the resulting negative externalities,this paper analyzed the efficiency functions of mine owners and the extraction upper limit when game happened.As mine owners＇decision-making on a prerequisite of subjective value of expected,the paper developed a＂level mark＂reference point of extraction upper limit and studied a restrictive mechanism by the use of the theory of＂prospect theory＂and Bayesian.Then by analyzing mine owners＇subjective expected utility for his each strategy,the paper concluded that Government tended to be game dominant and mining supervision be Pareto Efficiency under the restraint of Bayesian risk-cost induced mechanism,which will play a theoretical reference function in formulating energy resources exploitation policies.