农村经济组织中的“委托-代理”关系理论、实践与政策

Principal-agent Relationships in Rural Economic Organization:Theory,Practice and Policy

本文对农村基本生产资料的完全产权进行分割的基础上,界定了农村经济的基本特征及其经济组织的委托—代理关系的结构特征,并构建委托—代理理论模型,以中国农村改革实践对理论模型主要结论进行实证。我们认为,中国农村经济从合作化时期、人民公社时期一直到以家庭联产承包为基础的双层经营体制时期的变革是经济组织中委托—代理关系完善的过程,基于代理关系的激励机制是决定农业生产绩效的重要因素。

This paper defines the characteristics of the rural economy and structural characteristics of principal - agent relationships in it base on dividing complete property rights of basic agricultural means of production. And then, construct a principal - agent theory mode. We test this model using China＇s rural reform in 60 years. We find that： China＇s rural economy developing is the process of agency relationships and incentive mechanisms improving from the Cooperativeness to the Household Contract Responsibility. The agency relationships and incentive mechanisms are the important determining factor of the Agricultural production achievements.