公立大学的契约结构、相关的机会主义及其规制——基于新制度经济学的分析

The Public University's Contract Structure,Related Opportunisms and Its Regulation——Analysis Based on the New Institutional Economics

公有制的内在矛盾决定了公立大学的运行依赖于委托——代理制这种契约形式,作为一种制度安排的公立大学使得一群教师和一群学生避免了高昂的市场交易成本从而以较低成本走在了一起。从公立大学的内外部关系看,公立大学本质上是一系列契约的联结。契约的绝对不完备性,使得作为代理人的公立大学及其经营管理者与作为委托人的政府、教师和学生都存在机会主义倾向,而委托人的机会主义在传统的委托——代理理论中常被忽视。克服上述机会主义需要相应的规制安排。

Public ownership＇s internal inconsistencies determine that the public university,as the realization of public ownership,must depend on principle-agency.A group of teachers and students can flock together with comparatively low costs rather than high market transaction costs because of the public university as an institution arrangement.The public university essentially is the knot of series of contracts from the perspective of whose internal and external relationships.Whichever contract presents incompleteness,thus,the public university and its administrators as agents,the governments,teachers and students as principals are bounded to be opportunistic,the principals＇ opportunisms have been ignored by the traditional principle-agency theory.To overcome the above opportunisms calls for corresponding regulation arrangements.