探索可持续发展的新思路——地方政府短期行为和地方保护主义下社会福利损失的一个模型分析

A New Exploration of Sustainable Development

运用古诺均衡中的先后定价与同时定价的方法进行研究,可以证明在政府短期行为和地方保护主义下,社会总福利会有很大损失。鉴于造成这一损失的根源是地方政府掌握了过多干预社会正常经济活动的权力,解决办法应该是政府退出竞争性领域,让市场发挥自动调节的功能。

Most of the domestic scholars use gaming theory to study the short-term behaviors and protectionism of local governments. In this paper, the methods of successively pricing and simultaneously pricing are used under the Coumot equilibrium. It is concluded that the maximized social welfare fails as these local behaviors exist. The origin of this loss is the public right which entities the government to the basic function and direct function of intervention of economy, while the solution is to decrease this function and make the market moderate by itself.