终极控制人的控制权、现金流权与企业投资——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

Ultimate Control Right,Cash Flow Right and Corporation Investment

基于大小股东代理理论,本文分析了终极控制人的控制权、现金流权对我国企业投资不足和投资过度的影响。检验结果发现,在民营企业,终极控制人的控制权与现金流权偏离度越大,投资不足现象越严重,并且,终极控制人的现金流权越低,这种代理问题对投资效率的负效应表现得越明显;进一步检验发现,较高的现金持有偏好是终极控制人影响企业投资不足的可能机制。但以上结论在国有企业并不成立。本文从终极控制人视角拓展转型国家的投资理论,也从投资视角为理解产权效率提供了有益参考。

Based on agency theory of large and small shareholdings, this paper analyses the effects on underinvest- ment and overinvestment made by ultimate controlling shareholders of firms＇controlling rights and cash flow rights. The em- pirical results show that, as for ultimate controlling shareholders of private firms, the more the cash flow rights deviates the controlling rights, the more serious the ultimate controlling shareholders make underinvestment because of tunneling activi- ties. The negative effects of agent problems on investment inefficiency are mainly in firms of the lower cash flow rights Furthermore, we find that the high preference of cash holdings may possibly be the mechanism to ultimate controlling shareholders producing inefficiency investment. Overall, the above research gives a useful reference for understanding the disputation of privatization to improve efficiency from the view of the investment, and it also gives further discussion about the theory of the investments in developing countries.