技术不确定条件下R&D投资决策的期权博弈模型

Using game theory to model R&D investment decision-making under uncertainty

为了分析R&D投资的不确定性、灵活性和竞争因素对投资决策的影响,将博弈论纳入实物期权方法的分析框架,在技术不确定环境下,构造研发能力和投资成本均不对称的双寡头垄断期权博弈模型,得到企业作为跟随者、领先者和同时投资者的价值函数,分析研发能力对投资临界值的影响,讨论了可能投资均衡策略.结果表明:研发能力对跟随者投资临界值影响显著,增强自身研发能力将减小投资临界值,而竞争者的研发能力增强会增加投资临界值,并且研发能力差别较大时将发生序贯均衡.

In order to analyze the impact of R&D investment,it is necessary to deal with uncertainty,the need for flexibility,and incorporate competitive factors that affect investment decision-making.Game theory was incorporated into the analytical framework of real option approach.To accommodate uncertainty,a duopoly game based on asymmetric R&D capabilities and investments was constructed.In this model,cost functions for corporations who act respectively as followers,leaders,and investors were developed.The impact on investment thresholds of variations in R&D capabilities was analyzed.Possible equilibrium investment strategies were discussed.The results of the discussion indicate that R&D capability has a considerable impact on a follower's investment thresholds.Investment declined when its own R&D capacity rose,whereas it increased in response to rising R&D capability among its competitors.Further,a large gap in R&D capabilities gives rise to sequential equilibrium.