资源型企业重组中的委托代理关系研究

The Study on Principal-agent Relations in Restructuring Resource-based Enterprises

随着我国资源型企业的兼并重组,企业的规模不断扩大,经营者在企业经营管理活动中发挥的作用日益重要。规模扩大后的资源型企业不可能直接管理和经营自己的公司,需要通过层层委托代理关系,来实现自身产权的管理和经营。在此情况下,下属企业的所有权和经营权逐步分离,在资源型企业和子公司经营者之间就形成了委托代理关系。研究资源型企业对下属各子公司经营者的绩效考核,对我国资源型企业重组的深入和资源型企业的发展有着重要的现实意义。本文运用博弈论的分析方法,研究了资源型企业重组过程中的委托代理关系问题。研究结果表明,资源型企业是否选择对子公司经营者进行监督主要受监督成本、代理成本和惩罚成本的影响。最后,通过实证研究对博弈结果进行了检验,表明监督成本和惩罚成本与企业的监督倾向负相关,而代理成本与资源型企业的监督倾向正相关。

With the restructuring of resource-based enterprises, operators are playing more and more important roles in corporate operations. The operators in big resource-based enterprise can not manage the company themselves. Therefore, the principal-agent relation generated between the subsidiary company and resource-based enterprise. It is important to investigate the performance appraisal on subsidiary companies for the restructuring of resource-based enterprises. This paper investigates the principal-agent relations in restructuring resource-based enterprises using game theory. The results indicate that the decisions of resource-based enterprises are mainly affected by monitoring cost, agency cost and penalty cost. Finally, an empirical study is conducted to test the results based on game theory. The results indicates that monitoring cost and penalty cost have significantly negative effects on monitoring tendency, agency cost has significantly positive effect on monitoring tendency.