信任下的弱势农户与农信社的信贷博弈分析——以陕西省为例

A Study on the Credit Game Relationship between Poor Farmer and Rural Credit Cooperatives Based on Trust:Shaanxi Province as an Example

在实地调查了陕西周至、千阳两县小额信贷实施效果的基础上,运用博弈论基本方法,比较分析了不完全信息条件下与信任条件下农信社和弱势农户的融资博弈关系。在不完全信息条件下,农信社因害怕农户违约导致其收益处于完全损失状态下,因此会以较大的概率拒绝向弱势农户提供贷款,致使小额信贷无法实现。在信任条件下,弱势农户和农信社都了解对方将要采取合作的策略,因此信任会促使借贷顺利完成。据此针对博弈过程中的一些实现条件对小额信贷的运作提出政策建议。

Based on the survey of micro-credit implementation results of Zhouzhi and Qianyang counties, using the basic method of game theory, this paper compares and analyzes the financing game relationships between rural credit cooperatives and poor farmers under incomplete information and trust conditions. In the incomplete information conditions, because of being afraid of farmers＇ default and their own contract revenue being in a state of total loss, the rural credit cooperatives will refuse to provide loans for disadvantaged farmers with high probability, so micro-credit can not be achieved. Under the conditions of trust, the poor farmers and rural credit cooperatives both know each other will take the strategy of cooperation, so trust will promote the successful completion of borrowing. At last, the paper puts forward policy recommendations for the operation of micro-finance in the game process realization conditions.