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基于协调博弈的民营企业用人制度分析

Analysis of Human Management in Chinese Private Businesses Based on Bryant Play Game
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摘要 我国民营企业用人制度表现出"任人唯亲""以亲制疏"等特征,其根源在于"特殊信任"模式的主导地位。当民营企业规模较小时,"特殊主义"有利于减少企业的运作成本,但当民营企业超过一定规模时,"普遍主义"用人机制更适合企业的发展。因此,应该构建企业主与雇员之间的关系型、理念型心理契约,突破民营企业的家族信任,树立"以人为本"的用人观念以促进企业发展。 Human resources management in Chinese private businesses is characterized by "crony but not appointing people by abilities" and "relative supervising distant", which is caused by "particularistic trust". In this paper, Bryant play game is used and the conclusion is that the cost of government is low under the "particularistic trust" when businesses are small and " universalistic trust" is good choice with the development of businesses. Then, relational and ideological contract between organization and employees should be built, familism should be changed, and human - based concept should be set up in order to improve the development of private businesses.
作者 高志杰
机构地区 东北农业大学
出处 《东北农业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2010年第4期125-128,共4页 Journal of Northeast Agricultural University:Social Science Edition
基金 黑龙江省教育厅人文社会科学项目"黑龙江省中小企业技术创新战略研究"(11542018)的阶段性成果 东北农业大学博士科研启动项目"黑龙江省中小企业技术创新能力问题研究"的阶段性成果
关键词 用人制度 关系型 理念型心理契约 协调博弈 human management,relational and ideological contract, Bryant play game
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