控股股东决策控制、CEO激励与企业国际化战略

Decision Control of Controlling Shareholder,CEO Incentive and Firm Internationalization Strategy

国际化是企业重大战略举措,控股股东和CEO分别作为战略决策者和执行者,对国际化经营存在深刻影响。本文利用手工收集的上市公司国际化经营数据,基于代理理论的研究表明,当控股股东拥有战略决策控制权时,企业更可能采用国际化战略,并且国有控股股东比民营控股股东更倾向于采用国际化战略。采用国际化战略后,国际化扩张的快慢取决于CEO努力程度,控股股东需通过适当的激励机制调动CEO的积极性。总体上,薪酬、股权激励均有助于实现CEO激励相容,但股权激励的效果更为突出。对民营企业而言,股权激励的效果优于薪酬激励;而对国有企业而言,薪酬激励的效果更佳,股权激励尚未发挥应有的作用。本研究清晰有效地区分了控股股东和CEO分别作为战略决策、执行者对公司战略的影响,并进一步探讨了控股股东与CEO之间存在的协同作用,为CEO激励机制设计提供了理论和实证依据。

Firm internationalization is one of firm＇s most important strategic actions in emerging China, hut gathers less research attention. As the stock is highly concentrated of listed firms and the power distance is high in China, controlling shareholder and CEO play critical roles in firm internationalization. Based on agency theory, we build up a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of controlling shareholder＇s preference and CEO incentive on firm internationalization. Depart from previous studies, we adopt a process perspective and divide the internationalization process into two parts： the strategic decision-making and implementation of internationalization. Controlling shareholder plays a more important role in strategic decision-making of internationalization than in implementation, and CEO is more critical in the strategic implementation. With hand-collected data of firm internationalization, we find that firms tend to adopt internationalization strategy when decision right is held by controlling shareholder, and state-owned firms are more likely to involve in internationalization than private firms. After internationalization strategy is selected, the speed of firm international expansion is determined by CEO＇s endeavor to a large extent. The internationalization process is not without risk, and probably has negative effects on firm＇s short-term performance and also CEO＇s personal interests. Therefore, CEO incentive is of great importance in strategic implementation of internationalization. In this context, we further analyze how to motivate CEO and find that CEO compensation and ownership incentive have positive effects on firm internationalization but ownership incentive shows greater impact for the whole sample. Furthermore, ownership incentive is more effective than compensation incentive in private firms, and compensation incentive is more effective than ownership incentive in state-owned firms. To sum up, this article distinguishes the different roles of controlling shareholder and CEO in strategic decision and implantation process of firm internationalization, and discusses the synergy between controlling shareholder and CEO. The above findings provide theoretical and empirical evidences for CEO incen tive mechanism design.