不完全信息博弈的逻辑分析

Logical analysis of incomplete information game

在不完全信息静态博弈中,参与人选择的依据就是在给定自己的类型以及其他参与人的类型与策略选择之间关系的条件下,使得自己的期望收益最大化。而在不完全信息动态博弈中,参与人根据他所观察到的其他参与人的实际行动,来修正自己的初步判断,并根据这种不断变化的判断,选择自己的策略。

In incomplete information static game,the participation choose tactics that make their own expected revenue maximization on the condition that given its own type and relationship between types of other participants and strategy selection.In incomplete information dynamic game,the participants correct their initial judgments in accordance with real actions of other participants that he observed and choose their own strategy in the basis of this changing.