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企业集团内部合作技术创新的博弈分析 被引量:1

Game Analysis on Cooperative Innovation Among the Enterprise Group
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摘要 企业集团内部各成员单位之间通过建立合作技术创新组织,可以更好地发挥各自优势,获得集团整体利益最大化。从博弈论角度对企业集团内部合作创新的成本与收益分配问题进行了分析。结果表明:协同合作博弈时的技术创新总收益要大于非合作时的技术创新收益;集团公司合作创新组织总存在帕累托最优;合作创新的收益可以运用Rub inste in的讨价还价模型在成员企业之间进行分配。 Though founding Cooperative innovation organization, member units of an enterprise group may bring their respective advantages into full play,and maximize the total benefit of the group. In this paper,cooperative innovation cost and profit allocation problem are discussed based on the game theory, and relevant conclusion is drew out. The total innovation profit under cooperative game is always more than that under non-cooperative game. Pareto Optimality is always exist in group cooperative innovation organization, the total profit of cooperative innovation can be allocated between the members by using Rubinstein bargain model.
出处 《科技与经济》 CSSCI 2010年第4期90-92,共3页 Science & Technology and Economy
基金 国家自然科学基金项目--"面向敏捷供应链的知识服务体系及管理策略研究"(项目编号:70872010项目负责人:王道平)成果之一
关键词 合作创新 博弈理论 企业集团 cooperative innovation game theory enterprise group
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参考文献8

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