三类风险投标者共存下的一级价格拍卖

First-price auction with three types of risk bidders

许多拍卖文献在研究投标者的投标策略时,假设所有投标者要么是风险中性的,要么是风险规避的.但是,在实际投标中,可能风险中性、风险规避和风险爱好的投标者同时存在.针对1级价格密封式拍卖,假设3类风险投标者共存,通过引入"风险指标"度量3类风险投标者的风险态度,给出了投标者的对称均衡投标策略,推广了经典的独立私人估价模型;此外,说明各类风险偏好的投标者的"风险指标"不仅对自己的报价有正向影响,而且对其他风险偏好的投标者的报价有交叉影响.

In many auction literature studying bidders' bidding strategies,it is assumed that the bidders are either risk-neutral or risk-averse.However,there may exist three risk types of bidders(risk neutral,risk averser,and risk seeking) simultaneously in real world bidding.In this paper,we assume that there exist three risk types of bidders whose attitudes toward risk are measured by "the risk indicator" and we derive the bidders' equilibrium bidding strategies under the first-price sealed-bid auction,which extends the classical independent private value model.Additionally,we show that the risk indicators of the bidders not only have a positive effect on their own bids,but also have a cross effect on the other bidders' bids.